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1. Introduction 
The voluntary provision of public goods is a well-known problem in economics 
(Bergstrom/Blume/Varian 1986 and Cornes/Sandler 1996). Non-excludability from positive 
externalities leads to the underprovision by private entities. In the national context, govern-
ments can mitigate this problem. They can provide the appropriate level of public goods with 
financial resources from taxation. However, in the international context, this is more difficult 
because no “world government” exists that can take up this role. Consequently, international 
treaties have to rely on voluntary participation and must be designed in a self-enforcing way. 
In the presence of free-rider incentives, this frequently means that not all countries benefiting 
from an international public good participate and/or the level of provision only marginally 
exceeds non-cooperative levels (Murdoch/Sandler 1997a, b). The mitigation of global warm-
ing exemplifies this problem. In 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was signed after more than ten 
years of difficult negotiations. This treaty aims at reducing global greenhouse gas emissions 
by 5.2 percent compared to 1990 levels by 2008-12 – far below what would be advisable 
according to cost-benefit analyses.
1 Today, 7 years later, the Kyoto Protocol has still not been 
ratified and hence has not come into force. Even worse, the USA declared in 2001 that they 
withdraw from the Protocol. In the aftermaths of this decision, also other signatories started 
demanding to reduce their previously accepted moderate abatement targets even further.  
From the bumpy road towards an international climate agreement it is evident that there are 
some fundamental characteristics associated with the climate change that makes this environ-
mental problem even more difficult to solve than other transboundary pollution problems. 
Therefore, this paper has two purposes: a) shedding light on some fundamental forces that 
hamper successful treaty-making in the context of greenhouse gas mitigation and b) consid-
ering measures to improve the success of self-enforcing climate treaties. Our analysis com-
bines two modules: a) a computable general equilibrium model that captures the feedback 
between the economy, environmental damages and the climate system and b) a game theoretic 
model that determines stable coalitions in the presence of free-riding incentives. The combi-
nation of rigorous game theoretic analysis and numerical simulations constitutes a novelty 
compared to the existing literature on international environmental agreements. 
We identify four major forces that constitute obstacles for successful international environ-
mental agreements (IEAs) that are particularly pronounced in the case of climate change miti-
                                                 
1  For instance, see Nordhaus/Boyer (2003) and Kolstad/Toman (2001) for an overview of cost-
benefit studies on climate change.   2
gation. First, the larger the number of agents involved in the provision of public goods, the 
larger free-rider incentives will be (Cornes/Sandler 1996). Greenhouse gases emissions dis-
perse uniformly in the atmosphere and therefore constitute a pure public bad by which all 
nations are affected. In contrast, environmental problems, like for instance the “acid rain” in 
Europe (regulated under the 1985 Helsinki and 1994 Oslo Protocol) or transboundary water 
pollution in river basins (Rhine 2020 Action Plan of the International Commission for the 
Protection of the Rhine adopted in 1998) are of a more regional nature and therefore coopera-
tion proves somewhat easier.  
Second, long-run effects make cooperation more difficult than short and mid term effects. 
Greenhouse gas emissions accumulate in the atmosphere and decay only at a very low natural 
rate. Thus, current measures can steer atmospheric concentrations only in the very long-run 
(IPCC 2001). Consequently, abatement costs are to be borne today, but benefits in the form of 
reduced damages will only materialize in the far future. Since it takes more than a century 
before the benefits of emission reduction programs become visible, it is evident that even with 
a low discount rate, today’s abatement measures are characterized by very low benefit-cost 
ratios. Hence, ambitious emission reduction programs are not to be expected, which is even 
more true considering that short term success is important for governments. In contrast, sulfur 
emissions, which cause acid rain, also have a time-dimension, but benefits of abatement 
measures become visible after 5 to 10 years already.  
Third, high abatement costs and uncertain damages make cooperation unattractive. Many cli-
mate studies come to the conclusion that abatement costs are likely to be high for severe 
emission cutbacks (Weyant 1999). Moreover, damages are difficult to estimate and are un-
certain because of the complexity of the climate system (IPCC 2001). In contrast, abatement 
costs of sulfur emissions constantly dropped in the 80 and 90´s, damages were visible in the 
form of “forest death”, corrosion of ancient buildings and the decline of fish stocks in lakes 
that could be better estimated (Burtraw et al. 1997). Thus, even countries that did not sign the 
Helsinki Protocol on sulfur reduction in 1985 reduced their emissions substantially and most 
members reduced their emissions much beyond agreed targets (Finus/Tjøtta 2003 and 
Murdoch/Sandler 1997a).  
Fourth, as a tendency, the larger the asymmetry in terms of the cost-benefit structure from 
abatement, the larger the asymmetry will be in terms of the gains from cooperation, posing 
problems to self-enforcing treaties (Finus 2002). Given the global nature of greenhouse gases, 
the cost-benefit structure is very uneven between countries because of the large differences 
between industrialized countries, economies in transition and developing countries. Clearly,   3
also the Helsinki Protocol involved different actors, but all belonged to the “European conti-
nent”.  
In order to overcome these difficulties, we suggest two ways to alleviate problems. Clearly, 
we cannot change the nature of an environmental problem, but we may consider different 
designs of environmental treaties. One obvious measure in the presence of asymmetries 
between players is transfers that may help to implement at least second-best solutions. We 
consider various transfer schemes that have been proposed in the literature and study their 
effect on treaty formation.  
Another measure is a change of institutional rules where we focus on membership rules. At 
first glance, this may seem a less obvious measure since in the face of positive externalities 
from abatement, no restriction on membership seems necessary or advisable. However, as we 
show, changing the rule of open membership, which is typical for public goods, to exclusive 
membership, which is typical for club goods, can have a significant impact for successful 
treaty making.  
In what follows, we describe the empirical model in section 2 and discuss fundamental 
features of coalition formation in section 3. Subsequently, we analyze stability and measures 
to improve upon the success of climate change treaties in section 4. Section 5 raps up and 
points to future research questions. 
2.  Empirical Model  
The CLIMNEG World Simulation Model (in the sequel referred to as CWSM) is an 
integrated assessment, economy-climate model that resembles closely the seminal RICE 
model by Nordhaus/Yang (1996). An overview of the equations and parameters of the model 
are provided in the Appendix. A more detailed exposition of the model can be found in 
Eyckmans/Tulkens (2003). An important feature of integrated assessment models is the 
endogenous feedback of climate change damages on production and consumption 
possibilities. The economic part of CWSM consists of a longterm dynamic, perfect foresight 
Ramsey type of optimal growth model with endogenous investment and carbon emission 
reduction decisions. The carbon cycle and temperature change module are the same as in 
RICE. 
In the CWSM, the world is divided into six regions: USA,  JPN (Japan), EU (European 
Union), CHN (China), FSU (Former Soviet Union) and ROW (Rest of the World). In each 
region i, and in every time period t, t={1990, 2000, ...., 2330}, the following budget equation   4
describes how “potential GDP”,  i,t Y , can be allocated to consumption,  i,t Z , investment,  i,t I , 
emission abatement costs,  i,t i i,t YC ( ) µ , and climate change damages,  i,t i t YD (T ) ∆ : 
( ) ( ) i,t i,t i,t i,t i i,t i,t i t YZIY C Y D T =+ + µ + ∆         ( 1 )  
Output is produced with a production function F that maps combinations of capital stock  i,t K  
and labour input  i,t L  into regional output. The production technology is assumed to satisfy 
constant returns to scale of the Cobb-Douglas type: 
() ( ) i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t i,t Ya F K , L F K =≡          ( 2 )  
where  i,t a  is a technology shift parameter that is assumed to increase exogenously over time
2. 
Since labour supply is assumed to be inelastic and exogenous, we can relate output only to 
capital, incorporating the technology parameter  i,t a  in the "new" production function 
i,t i,t F (K ). From the input data reported in the Appendix, it is evident that capital at t=1990 is 
mainly concentrated in USA, JPN and EU whereas the labor force is concentrated in CHN 
and ROW.  
Capital accumulation is described in the standard way: 
[ ] i,t 1 K i,t i,t K1 K I + =− δ +           ( 3 )  
where  K δ  denotes the capital depreciation rate.  
The cost function Ci maps abatement effort µi,t into the share of “potential GDP” devoted to 
abatement. In order to obtain abatement costs, Ci has to be multiplied by Yi,t as this is done in 
expression (1). Abatement costs are assumed to be an increasing and convex function of 
emission abatement effort. Abatement effort  [ ] i,t 0,1 µ∈  measures the relative emission 
reduction compared to the Business-as-usual scenario (BAU) without any abatement policy. 
For the parameters given in the Appendix, USA, JPN and EU face steep and CHN and ROW 
flat marginal abatement costs measured in US$ per ton of carbon. The regional differences in 
abatement costs reflect mainly differences in energy efficiency. Energy efficient regions often 
face higher costs to cut back emissions than regions characterized by low energy efficiency. 
The damage function Di maps temperature change ∆Tt into the share of “potential GDP” 
destroyed by climate change damages. Hence, damage costs are computed by multiplying Di 
                                                 
2  The rate of technological progress differs between regions and decreases exogenously over time. 
The time paths of the rates of technological progress are taken from Nordhaus/Yang (1996).   5
by Yi,t. Climate change damages are an increasing and convex function of temperature change 
t T ∆ . From the input data in the Appendix, it is evident that damage functions are particularly 
steep in EU and ROW, to a lesser extent in USA, JPN, and relatively flat in FSU and CHN. 
The high damage estimate (as a percentage of “potential GDP”) for ROW is due to the fact 
that climate change is believed to affect developing countries more strongly than 
industrialized countries because their economies tend to depend more on climate related 
production processes like agriculture, fishery and forestry (IPCC 2001). The low damage 
estimate for FSU is due to some expected benefits from moderate temperature increase like 
the expansion of arable land to the north. 
Temperature change  t T ∆  is related to carbon concentration according to an increasing 
function G (see Appendix for details): 
() tt TG M ∆=             ( 4 )  
where concentration in turn depends on emissions that accumulate in the atmosphere 
according to a standard linear stock externality process: 
[ ] t1 M t i , t
iN
M1 M E +
∈
=− δ + β ∑           ( 5 )  
where M denotes carbon concentration,  M δ  the natural decay rate and β the airborn fraction 
of emissions, that is, the fraction of emissions added to atmospheric concentrations. Since 
0.64 β= , almost 2/3 of carbon emissions are added to the carbon stock which decrease very 
slowly since  M 0.0833 δ= .  
Emissions are proportional to “potential GDP”: 
i,t i,t i,t i,t E1 Y  =α −µ           ( 6 )  
where the exogenous parameter  i,t α  denotes the emission-ouput ratio and is assumed to 
decline over time due to exogenous energy efficiency improvements
3. 
Taken together, we call  i,t Y  on the left hand side of equation (1) as “potential GDP” because 
this is the output that could be produced in the absence of the climate change problem. 
Rewriting (1) allows us interpreting the lefthand side of the budget equation as “green GDP”, 
that is, production net of climate change damages and abatement costs: 
                                                 
3  Also the time paths of exogenous energy efficiency improvements for the different regions are 
taken from Nordhaus and Yang (1996).   6
() () i,t i i,t i t i,t i,t Y1 C D T Z I  −µ −∆ =+          ( 7 )  












∑            ( 8 )  
where  i ρ  stands for the discount rate of region i and Ω denotes the time horizon. From the 
Appendix, it is evident that we choose a relatively low discount rate of 1.5 percent, except for 
CHN and ROW where we assume 3 percent in order not to “overestimate” the incentives of 
these regions in climate change policies. The strategy vector consists of a time path (35 
decades
4, starting in 1990) for emission abatement and investment for all six regions, 
i,t i,t i N;t 0, , s{ I, } ∈= Ω =µ … , and hence is of length 2x35x6=420.  
3.  Formation of Coalitions  
3.1  No Cooperation and Full Cooperation 
In this subsection, we consider two benchmarks: no and full cooperation. No cooperation 
means that each region maximizes its own lifetime consumption with respect to its own strat-
egy vector, taking the strategies of all other regions as given. The solution is the Nash equilib-
rium strategy vector 
N s . From the perspective of coalition formation, this can be interpreted 
as if each region forms a singleton coalition by itself. In contrast, full cooperation maximizes 
the sum of lifetime consumption over all regions. That is, each region chooses abatement and 
investment considering not only the effect on its own region but also on all other regions. 
Because emissions constitute a negative externality
5, the socially or globally optimal strategy 
vector 
S s  differs from the Nash equilibrium 
N s . The social optimum can be interpreted as if 
all regions form one coalition, called the grand coalition. Global abatement is higher in the 
social optimum than in the Nash equilibrium. However, also in the Nash equilibrium, some 
abatement is undertaken unilaterally since - compared to the business as usual scenario (BAU) 
- at least national damages are taken in consideration when choosing the non-cooperative 
strategy vector 
N s .  
The difference between Nash equilibrium and social optimum shows up in a very different 
development of global emissions along the time axis. Whereas Nash equilibrium emissions 
                                                 
4    We choose a sufficiently long time period to avoid „end point bias”. However, due to 
discounting, only a shorter period is strategically relevant for players.  
5   The mirror image is: abatement constitutes a positive externality. See in particular subsection 3.2.   7
follow very closely the business as usual path and grow steadily due to economic growth, 
social optimal emissions rise only until 2150, level off and decrease afterwards. For instance, 
in the year 2200, global emissions in the social optimum are only one third of those in the 
Nash equilibrium. This difference also shows up in the development of carbon concentration 
as this is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 about here 
In 1990, atmospheric carbon concentration amounts to approximately 750  GtC. BAU-
concentration rises steadily and reaches 3443 GtC in 2200. Doubling of concentration with 
respect to 1990 takes place between 2080 and 2090. The NASH-concentration path follows 
closely the BAU-path. In contrast, SOCIAL-concentration grows at a much slower rate and 
reaches 2017 GtC in 2200. Doubling of atmospheric carbon concentration is postponed until 
some time between 2110 and 2120. The carbon concentration levels off at about 2000 GtC by 
the year 2200.  
Taken together, we may conclude that there is a large difference between no and full 
cooperation at the global level in ecological terms (emissions and concentration). This is also 
true at the level of individual countries. Taking averages of abatement efforts over time, we 
find that CHN abates about 7.70%, followed by EU with 7.24% and USA with 6.44% in the 
Nash equilibrium. The lowest abatement effort is undertaken by ROW with only 1.45%. 
World average abatement amounts to 3.74%. For ROW, low abatement is due to strong free-
riding incentives within this heterogeneous region.
6 For CHN, high abatement is due to low 
marginal abatement costs and for EU this is due to their high climate change damage 
valuation. In the social optimum, world average abatement is 37.14%. CHN and ROW are 
required to reduce their emissions substantially more than other regions (68.13% and 55.50%, 
respectively) due to their low marginal abatement costs.  
In terms of “potential GDP” (Yi in equation (1)), differences between Nash equilibrium and 
social optimum are not very pronounced. This is due to three reasons. First, abatement and 
damage costs consitute only a small fraction of total production and consumption. Second, 
negative externalities of carbon emissions occur mainly in the future but receive less weight 
due to discounting. Third, abatement costs are relatively high compared to the benefits from 
                                                 
6    As in Nordhaus/Yang (1996), climate change damage parameter of ROW has been revised 
downward for all scenarios in which ROW acts as a singleton in order to account for the fact that 
this region comprises many countries. Without this correction, ROW would produce 
unrealistically high rates of emission control when it does not cooperate with other regions.    8
reduced emissions for greenhouse gases, so that also in the social optimum only moderate 
action is required. Hence, it is not surprising that difference in discounted lifetime world 
consumption (i.e., global welfare) between the Nash equilibrium (338,060 million $) and the 
social optimum (339,831 million  $) – though not small in absolute magnitude (1,771 
million $) – is not big in relative terms (0.52%). The major winners from cooperation are EU 
(0,924 million  $), USA (0,637  million $)  and JPN (0,315  million $). Also FSU (0,231 
million $) gains, but CHN (-0,284 million $) and to a smaller extent ROW (-0,052 million $) 
loose. In terms of emission abatement, USA, JPN and EU have to contribute below average to 
the socially optimal solution, but due to above average marginal damages, they benefit much 
from joint abatement. This “favorable” incentive structure is particular pronounced for EU. In 
contrast, CHN and ROW face just the opposite incentive structure that is particular 
“unfavorable” for CHN. CHN contributes well above average to joint abatement and benefits 
only very little due to low marginal abatement costs and damages. 
3.2 Partial  Cooperation 
In this subsection, we consider intermediate steps between no and full cooperation. Partial 
cooperation means that a subgroup of regions - at least two regions, but less than all regions - 
form a coalition. This implies that members of this subgroup (i.e., non-trivial or non-singleton 
coalition) maximize the sum of their members´ lifetime consumption. That is, each member 
chooses its strategy vector considering the effect on its coalition, but ignores the effect on 
outsiders. Outsiders are assumed to act as singletons, as described in the non-cooperative 
equilibrium. Hence, the equilibrium strategy vector 
P s  can be interpreted as “partial Nash 
equilibrium between the coalition and outsiders” (Chander/Tulkens 1997). Table 1 gives an 
overview of possible coalition structures that are partitions of players with one coalition S and 
the remaining players acting as singletons, c=(S, 1, ..., 1). 
Table 1 about here 
The first and the last coalition structure represent no and full cooperation (corresponding to 
Nash equilibrium and social optimum), respectively; the second to fifth coalition structure 
represent partial cooperation (see column 1). In the context of 6 players, there are 15 possi-
bilities to form a coalition of two members, 20 possibilities to form a coalition of three mem-
bers and so on and so forth (see column 2). Overall, there are 58 different coalition structures. 
For reference reason, we number coalition structures consecutively, starting with the coalition 
structure comprising only singletons and finishing with the coalition structure comprising the 
grand coalition (see column 3).    9
In Table 2, we display a selection of coalition structures and their associated welfare and 
ecological implications. Coalition structures are listed in descending order of global welfare 
(discounted lifetime consumption). Welfare, concentration and emissions are measured in 
relative terms, that is, by how much they “close the gap” between the social optimum and the 
Nash equilibrium. From Table 2, the following conclusions emerge.  
The commonly hold view that a high participation indicates success of an IEA proves to be 
wrong. For instance, coalition structure no. 57 comprises a coalition of five regions but ranks 
lower than many coalition structures comprising coalitions of 3 or 4 members coalitions, and 
even lower than coalition structure no. 5, including a coalition of only JPN and ROW. Thus, 
the identity of members may matter more than the number of participants for the success of 
cooperation.  
From a brief glance of the first 15 ranked coalition structures, it is evident that, as a tendency, 
the importance of membership decreases along the following sequence: ROW, CHN, EU, 
USA, FSU and JPN. ROW´s and CHN´s important role stems from the fact that they can pro-
vide cheap abatement. Similar, JPN´s low importance is due to expensive abatement. How-
ever, there is also an additional dimension related to environmental damages. The higher mar-
ginal damages of a coalition member are, the higher joint abatement efforts will be, anything 
else being equal. This explains the importance of EU and USA compared to FSU and JPN. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the “old Kyoto coalition” comprising USA, JPN, EU and 
FSU (no. 50) ranks relatively low since the two key players CHN and ROW are outsiders. A 
similar conclusion applies to the “new Kyoto coalition” (no. 28) after the withdrawal of USA. 
It is evident that this decision implies a dramatic drop in welfare and ecological variables, 
almost to non-cooperative levels.  
Table 2 about here 
Despite our qualification about participation and membership, it is evident that all coalition 
structures different from the singleton coalition structure no. 1 generate higher global welfare 
(and lower global emissions and concentration). This is due to two important properties of 
coalition formation that apply to our model. The first property is called superadditivity. 
Superadditivity means that if a region joins a singleton or a coalition, aggregate welfare of all 
regions that are involved in this merger increases. In other words, there is a “coalitional gain” 
from cooperation. The second property is called positive externality. Positive externality 
means that if a region joins a singleton or a coalition to form a bigger coalition, all outsiders 
that are not involved in this merger benefit from the merger.   10
Both properties imply that global welfare is higher in any coalition structure different from 
that consisting of only singletons. This applies also to the welfare of individual regions that 
remain singletons. The most favorable condition for a singleton is if all other regions form a 
coalition. However, despite superadditivity holds, individual regions that are members of a 
coalition may be worse off than in the Nash equilibrium. This has already been illustrated for 
the grand coalition in subsection 3.1, but is also true for partial cooperation. Only 10 out of 56 
coalition structures that constitute partial cooperation are individually rational, i.e., imply no 
loss to any member compared to the Nash equilibrium. None of the top 15 ranked coalition 
structures in Table 2 are individually rational. This also applies to the “old and new Kyoto 
coalition”. Not a single coalition including CHN as a member is individually rational, con-
firming the unfavorable incentive structure of this country already identified for full coopera-
tion. From Table 1, it is evident that no coalition with 5 members and only one with 4 mem-
bers is individually rational. This finding stresses the large asymmetries between regions. It 
also suggests that without transfers cooperation will prove to be very difficult. In particular, 
without transfers, a key player of cheap abatement, namely CHN, can hardly be convinced to 
join a climate treaty. 
4.  Stability of Coalitions 
4.1  A First Approach 
In this subsection, we have a first look at the stability of coalition structures. Clearly, a neces-
sary condition for stability is individual rationality. Due to the positive externality property, a 
coalition member that receives a lower welfare than in the singleton coalition structure will 
gain by leaving the coalition
7. However, even if individual rationality holds, a coalition mem-
ber may have an incentive to leave its coalition which is not the case provided the following 
condition holds:
8 
internal stability:  ii w( S ) w( S\{ i } ) ≥    iS ∀ ∈        ( 9 )  
                                                 
7   After leaving, a region can free-ride on the efforts of the remaining coalition. Due to the positive 
externality property, the deviator will be better off than in the singleton coalition structure. 
8    The concept of internal&external stability is due to d´Aspremont et al. (1983). It has been 
frequently applied to study stability of IEAs (e.g., Barrett 1994, Cararro/Siniscalco 1993 and 
Hoel 1992) and belongs to non-cooperative coalition theory. For an overview of other non-
cooperative concepts see Bloch (1997) and Yi (1997) in the general context and Finus (2001 and 
2003) in the context of IEAs. For applications of concepts of cooperative coalition theory see for 
instance Chander/Tulkens (1997) and Germain/Toint/Tulkens (1998).   11
If a coalition member i leaves coalition S to become a singleton, it saves abatement costs. 
However, not only the deviator will reduce its abatement effort but also the remaining regions 
in coalition S\{ i } will abate less, leading to an increase of damages in each region. The 
importance of both welfare effects determines the incentive of remaining in or leaving coali-
tion S. As a tendency, given a coalition S, the more regions join S, the higher the incentive of 
current members to leave their coalition will be. The reason is that more members mean 
higher abatement and hence higher abatement costs and lower damages. Hence, the incentive 
to leave a coalition increases gradually due to the convexity of abatement cost functions and 
the concavity of benefits from reduced damages. However, there is also a second dimension 
of stability: 
external stability:  jj w( S ) w( S { j } ) ≥∪    jS ∀ ∉        ( 1 0 )  
External stability is the mirror image of internal stability: no singleton should have an incen-
tive to join coalition S. The advantage of joining is that damages drop: global abatement 
increases and, in particular, own efforts are matched by those of other members. However, 
higher abatement means also higher abatement costs. Again, the importance of both welfare 
effects determines the incentive of joining coalition S or remaining an outsider. For the same 
reason as mentioned above, as a tendency, the more regions already joined coalition S, the 
less attractive it becomes to follow suit. 
Testing for stability, it turns out that 9 out of 11 individually rational coalition structures are 
internally stable. Since the singleton coalition structure is internally stable by definition, this 
implies that 8 out of 10 coalition structures that constitute genuine partial cooperation are 
internally stable. Those coalition structures are indicated bold faced in Table 1. Interestingly, 
the two individually rational coalition structures out of ten that are not internally stable are 
exactly those with “best performance” in terms of global welfare, global emissions and con-
centration. This confirms the fundamental forces mentioned above: the free-rider incentive 
increases with the level of abatement.  
Unfortunately, none of the 9 internally stable coalition structures is externally stable. Hence, 
partial cooperation is not stable – at least without transfers and/or a change of institutional 
rules.    12
4.2  A Second Approach: Transfers 
4.2.1 Preliminaries 
From the previous discussion it became evident that a necessary condition for internal stabil-
ity is individual rationality that is frequently violated because of large asymmetries between 
regions. Thus, an obvious way out of this dilemma seems to be transfers. For instance, con-
sider a coalition structure c( S , 1 , 1 ,, 1 ) = …  and assume that each coalition member iS ∈  
receives additionally to its welfare  i w (c) a transfer  i t (c) of the following type: 
() ( )
NN
ii ii i i
iS
t ( c ) w ( c )wc wc w ( c )
∈
  =− + λ −   ∑   (11) 
where 
N
i w (c )  is the welfare level in the Nash equilibrium, corresponding to the coalition 
structure with only singletons 
N c (1,1, ,1) = … . The first term on the left hand side in (11) puts 
everybody back to its Nash equilibrium payoff, the second allocates the aggregate gain to the 
coalition from cooperation to its members where  i λ  is a weight,  i 10 ≥λ ≥ ,  i iS 1 ∈ λ = ∑ . 
Substituting (11) into  ii i ˆ w (c) w (c) t (c) =+  gives: 
()
NN
ii i i i
iS
ˆ w( c ) w( c ) w c w( c )
∈
  =+ λ −   ∑         ( 1 2 )  
Because  ()
N
ii iS [w c w (c )] 0
∈ − > ∑  is true due to superadditivity, every member is better off 
than in the Nash equilibrium. Note that (12) can be interpreted as the outcome of a Nash bar-
gaining solution. The “standard” Nash bargaining solution is a special case where  i 1/#S λ=  - 
that is, equal sharing. However, one may also consider different weights that are typically 
interpreted as bargaining power in the game theoretic literature. Below, we consider several 
transfer schemes of the form in (11) that have been proposed in the literature and which differ 
in terms of weights. There, however, weights are usually not interpreted from a positive but 
more from a normative point of view. 
4.2.2  Motivation and Fundamental Features 
There is a long tradition in the literature to consider different transfer rules in the context of 
international environmental problems. On the one hand, the empirical literature has given 
much attention to the moral and philosophical motivation of various rules (Rose/Stevens 
1998, Rose et al. 1998 and Stevens/Rose 2002). However, most studies consider only welfare 
effects in terms of abatement costs, giving only an incomplete picture of the gains from co-
operation, letting alone the incentive to form self-enforcing agreements. Only a few studies 
consider also the dimension of damage costs and check stability. However, typically, they   13
consider only a small portfolio of well-known bargaining rules (e.g., Nash bargaining solution 
with equal weights or Chander/Tulkens transfer rule; see, e.g., Botteon/Carraro 1997 and 
Germain/Toint/Tulkens 1998).
9 On the other hand, the theoretical literature has either 
assumed symmetric players, rendering transfers redundant, or assumed a very particular form 
of asymmetry (e.g., two types of countries) with only one or two transfer schemes (e.g., 
Barrett 1997 and Hoel 1992). Therefore, it is one of the purposes of this paper to consider a 
large variety of transfer schemes, studying their effects on coalition formation and stability 
with an empirical model.  
In the following, we first discuss the input data to compute weights of the various transfer 
schemes. Then we introduce our transfer schemes, briefly mention their motivation, but refer 
the reader for a more detailed description to the empirical literature mentioned above. The 
discussion is illustrated in Table 3. 
Table 3 about here 
The first three rows of Table 3 show the base data on gross domestic product (GDPi), popula-
tion (POPi) and emissions (Ei) for the base year 1990 as it enters our model (see Appendix). 
This base data is also used as input to compute weights of the different transfer schemes. 
Rows four to six show some commonly used indicators of economic and ecological perform-
ance of different regions. Emissions per capita (Ei/POPi) illustrates that USA citizens are the 
largest and ROW citizens the smallest emitters per head. GDP per capita (GDPi/POPi) indi-
cates that CHN is the poorest and JPN the richest region in our model. Emissions per unit of 
GDP (Ei/GDPi) is a commonly used indicator to measure energy efficiency. It is evident that 
the Japanese is the most and the Chinese the least energy efficient economy. 
We now turn to the different scenarios. Scenario 0 is the benchmark case without transfers 
and scenario 1 to 8 represent different transfer schemes, resulting from different weights. 
Column 1 lists the numbers and names that we attach to each scenario and column 2 provides 
the formula for computing weights  i λ . Subsequent columns display weights ( i λ ) and trans-
fers ( i t ) under the assumption of the grand coalition. This gives a rough indication of the 
welfare implications of different scenarios, though the values will differ for other coalition 
structures with partial cooperation. We also display the number of violations of internal 
stability in terms of region i (VISi), considering all 58 coalition structures. Since there are 31 
coalition structures where region i is a member of a coalition of at least two members, the 
maximum number of possible violations is 31. Again, the number of violations can only be a 
                                                 
9   An exception is for instance Bosello/Buchner/Carraro (2003).   14
crude and first indication of stability implications of different scenarios. For instance, the 
absence of transfers (scenario 0) favors in particular EU (VISi=0) and puts CHN (VISi=31) at 
a big disadvantage, confirming observations above. For coalition formation, this has two 
implications. Either only regions with a similar incentive structure, e.g., USA and JPN or FSU 
and ROW can form a stable coalition, or asymmetries have to be balanced via transfers. 
Scenario 1 assumes equal weights. That is, each member receives the same share from the 
gains from cooperation. This solution may be seen a focal point of fairness in the sense of 
Schelling (1960). However, it treats all participants equally, regardless, how much they con-
tribute to cooperation and regardless of the size or other characteristics of their economy. This 
is different in scenario 2 where weights are related to population. The normative idea behind 
this rule may be summarized as: “one man one vote”. We call scenario 1 and 2 “egalitarian 1” 
and “egalitarian 2”. For the grand coalition, “egalitarian 1” means a larger share of the gains 
from cooperation for CHN and ROW compared to “no transfers”. This initiates transfers from 
USA, JPN and EU to CHN, FSU and ROW. That this means a substantial redistribution of 
welfare, and, in fact, again, an asymmetry, but opposite to that in the no transfer case, is evi-
dent from the change of the number of “VIS”. A similar but even a more pronounced pattern 
holds for “egalitarian 2” because population is strongly concentrated in CHN and ROW.  
Scenario 3 relates weights to the inverse of the emission per capita ratio and scenario 4 does 
this with respect to the inverse of the GDP per capita ratio. Scenario 3´s motivation is that 
every man should have the same “right to pollute”. It is also associated with historical respon-
sibility for the current stock of greenhouse gases. Since USA has the highest emission per 
capita ratio, they receive the lowest weight and because this is completely reversed for CHN 
and ROW, both regions receive high weights. Scenario 4 allocates the gains from cooperation 
to the “poor” and thus uses environmental policy as a vehicle to transfer money from the 
“rich” to the “poor”. The parameter η is usually referred to as the “degree of inequality aver-
sion”. We consider three values were η→+ ∞ would correspond to the “Rawlsian maximin 
rule”. In our model, already  10 η=  approximates this rule since all weights are zero, except 
China´s weight that is 1 in the grand coalition. However, even a value of “only”  0.25 η=  
implies a substantial reshuffling of the gains from cooperation from the “rich” to the “poor”. 
We follow the literature and call scenario 4 “ability to pay” and because of its similar design 
scenario 3 “ability to pollute”. Again, “extreme” weights in scenario 3 and 4 show up in a 
high number of “VISi” in industrialized countries and low numbers for developing countries 
and economies in transition.   15
Scenario 5 and 6 are related to the ecological dimension and are therefore called “ecological 
reward” and “ecological subsidy”, respectively. Both scenarios relate weights to energy effi-
ciency that is measured as “emissions per output”. “Ecological reward” means that those 
regions with a high energy efficiency receive a high share of the gains from cooperation 
whereas this is just the opposite with “ecological subsidy”. Whereas the motivation for 
rewards is more or less self-evident, the motivation for subsidies has to argue that dirty 
regions should receive sufficient resources to clean up their environment. Not surprisingly, 
energy efficiency is very high in JPN and EU but very low in CHN and FSU. Due to low 
emissions associated with its low stage of economic development, ROW´s energy efficiency 
is relatively high. 
Scenario 7 and 8 are the mirror images of scenarios 3 and 4. Whereas scenarios 3 and 4 
implied a major redistribution of the gains from cooperation based on “ecological or welfarian 
justice”, scenario 7 and 8 more or less preserve the “status quo”. That is, these transfer 
schemes acknowledge “political reality” that huge transfers are politically not feasible.  
Overall, Table 3 suggests that except for the “pragmatic solutions” “status quo 1” and “status 
quo 2”, the amount of transfers may be very large which is evident by comparing the total 
amount of transfers under the various scenarios (last column) and recalling that the total gain 
from cooperation amounts to 1,771 million  $.
10 It is already evident that many transfer 
schemes, though they may be grounded on well-defendable moral motives, change the asym-
metry of the no transfer scenario, but may introduce another asymmetry. In particular, the 
high and very concentrated violations of internal stability under some scenarios already indi-
cate that some transfer schemes may be regarded as “just” but may not be very useful in 
encouraging a high voluntary and self-enforcing participation.  
4.2.3 Results 
Table 4 lists internal and externally stable coalition structures that are stable under at least one 
scenario. A “X” means that this coalition structure is internally and externally stable (as 
defined in section 4.1) under a particular scenario; what “X” means will be explained in 
section 4.3.  
                                                 
10  „Total“ transfers in the last column of Table 3 are the sum of all positive transfers (=sum of all 
negative transfers) but not of all transfers that would be zero by definition. Total transfers are an 
indicator of the amount of financial resources redistributed by the transfer scheme. It is important 
to note that because transfers are computed according to (11) it can happen that total transfers 
exceed the total gain from cooperation. (For instance, suppose  ( )
N
ii w( c) w c 0 − >  and  i 1 λ = , 
then  ( )
N
ii i iS t( c ) w c w( c ) ∈  >−  ∑ ).   16
Whereas in the no transfer case no coalition was stable, now at least one coalition structure is 
stable under each scenario. With exception of scenario 4c, only one or two coalition structures 
are stable. No coalition larger than 3 members is stable and most stable coalitions comprise 
only two members. This stresses that individual rationality is a necessary but by no means a 
sufficient condition for stability. Also with transfers, the free-rider incentive increases with 
the size of coalitions. Nevertheless, also small coalitions can make a difference by closing the 
gap between social optimum and Nash equilibrium under most scenarios by 50 or more per-
cent. This confirms a central result obtained from the game theoretical literature on interna-
tional environmental agreements: when the difference between social optimum and Nash 
equilibrium is small, coalitions are able to close this gap more successfully than when this gap 
is large.
11 As argued in section 3.1, in our model this difference is small and amounts to only 
0.52 percent in welfare terms.  
It is interesting to observe that no coalition including only the key industrialized regions USA, 
JPN and EU is stable. Hence, neither the “old” nor the “new” Kyoto coalition is stable. More-
over, scenario 1 to 4b and 6 do not involve any of the key industrialized regions, but only 
FSU, CHN and ROW. This indicates that it is not that straightforward to establish stable co-
operation between industrialized countries, countries in transition and developing countries 
through morally motivated transfers. As conjectured already in the previous subsection, this is 
partly due to the fact that most transfers replace one asymmetry by another. Therefore, it is 
not surprising that “mixed membership” is found for the two status quo scenarios. Under most 
scenarios, the number of violations VISi as listed in Table 3 already provides a good indica-
tion which regions participate in a stable coalition as listed in Table 4: only regions with a low 
VISi number form stable coalitions. 
However, whereas asymmetries hamper internal stability, they foster external stability. For 
instance, as observed in the previous subsection, scenario 1 favors CHN, FSU and ROW at 
the expenses of USA, JPN and EU. Therefore, the coalition between CHN, FSU and ROW is 
externally stable because no key industrialized country has an incentive to join this coalition. 
4.3  A Third Approach: Changing Membership Rules 
4.3.1 Introduction 
In subsection 4.1, it became evident that only 9 coalition structures are internally stable in the 
case of no transfers of which none is externally stable. Clearly, since participation is volun-
                                                 
11   Barrett (1994) called this finding a paradox. For a summary, see Finus (2003).    17
tary, it seems difficult to challenge the condition of internal stability. Of course, one could 
argue that if after a region leaves its coalition and the remaining members were to punish the 
culprit harsh, stability would be easier to enforce. Though this is certainly true, punishment 
must also be credible. In our model, the remaining regions reoptimize their strategies after a 
deviation, typically meaning that they revise their abatement targets downward. However, 
they choose their equilibrium strategy, which is a best reply under the “new” condition, but 
not a strategy that hurts the free-rider at any cost to punishers.  
Alternatively, however, one may consider a change of the condition of external stability. 
Taken literally, external stability means an open membership rule where every outsider can 
join the coalition without asking for acceptance. However, suppose membership is exclusive 
and that current members of a coalition vote either by majority or unanimity voting about 
accession of a new member. Such voting procedures, though usually not known from interna-
tional environmental agreements, are frequently part of many other international treaties, like 
for instance WTO, European Union and Security Council. Nevertheless, there seems a priori 
no reason why such alternative rules should not be considered. Basically, such a change may 
be interpreted as changing the typical rule for public goods to rules typical for club goods. 
It is easy to see that such a change may imply that some internally stable coalitions that are 
externally unstable under open membership may become externally stable under exclusive 
membership. Thus, the interesting question is whether “more stability” translates into higher 
global welfare. Before doing so, it is important to pause for a second and to realize that a 
change of membership is not just a “technical” trick. For instance, it could be argued that cur-
rent members never turn down an application because more members means more contribu-
tors to cooperation. However, in our model, a coalition S{ i } ∪  increases abatement efforts 
compared to coalition S, which may be regarded as “too ambitious” by at least some of the 
current members. Consequently, one could argue that all current members of S could just 
allow i to join, asking it to increase its abatement effort, but that all members S do not change 
their economic strategies. Alternatively, one could argue that i must not join coalition S, but 
may just increase its abatement effort, which current members neither can avoid nor they have 
an interest to do so. However, both alternatives can never be in the interest of the “potential 
accessor” i. The reason is simple: under coalition structure c=(S, 1, ..., 1),  ii s( s , s ) − =  is the 
equilibrium economic strategy vector that implies that  i s  is a best reply to  i s−  (and vice 
versa). Consequently, if under coalition structure c′=(S{ i } ∪ , 1, ...1)  i s−  is the same as under 
c=(S, 1, ..., 1), it cannot be an improvement for i to change its strategy to  i s′  when joining   18
coalition S. A similar argument applies if i only changes its strategy without joining coalition 
S. 
4.3.2 Results 
In Table 4, “X” indicates stable coalition structures under exclusive membership where we 
restrict attention to unanimity voting. In the case of no transfers (scenario 0), the impact is 
dramatic. Now seven coalition structures are stable where the most successful achieves a wel-
fare level of 60.7 percent. Also for the various transfer schemes the maximum welfare is usu-
ally raised, though the changes are not so pronounced as in the case of no transfer. The largest 
difference can be observed for scenario 7, Status Quo 1. Obviously, exclusive membership 
makes not much difference for scenarios 1 to 4c because industrialized regions have no inter-
est anyway in joining non-industrialized regions.  
Taken together, the results stress that institutional rules may be as important as transfers for 
the stability of international environmental agreements. In particular, if transfers are not avail-
able, difficult to implement or politically not feasible, then a change of institutional rules may 
be an alternative measure to increase the success of cooperation. This is even more true when 
considering such institutional changes involve basically no costs. Moreover, now with exclu-
sive membership, morally motivated transfer schemes (scenario 1 to 6) are with one exception 
inferior in welfare terms to no transfers and the two status quo rules. This indicates that in a 
second-best-world with free-rider incentives moral motives may not always be a good guide 
to establish effective agreements. 
5. Summary,  Conclusion and Discussion 
Our approach is novel in the sense that we combine rigorous game theoretic analysis of coali-
tion formation with numerical simulations in the context of global warming. The cost-benefit 
analysis was based on a dynamic integrated assessment model that captures the feedback 
between the economy, environmental damages and the climate system. The model comprises 
six world regions: USA, Japan, European Union, China, Former Soviet Union and “Rest of 
the World”. Stability of coalitions was tested with the concept of internal and external stabil-
ity. From our simulations seven key results emerged. First, in the context of global warming, 
the difference between full and no cooperation is large in ecological terms but small in wel-
fare terms. This is because abatement costs are large compared to estimated damage costs, 
both costs constitute a small portion in relation to production and consumption and benefits 
from abatement occur in the far future. Second, though stable coalitions are only small, they 
can close this small gap by a considerable amount. We recognized that this conclusion is in   19
line with theoretical findings of simpler models on international environmental agreements. 
Third, membership or identity may be more important for partial cooperation than a high 
degree of participation. Coalitions that do not comprise key players with low marginal abate-
ment costs (e.g., CHN) and/or high marginal damages (e.g., EU and ROW) will not achieve 
much at the global level. This result indicated that concluding success only from participation 
without measuring the effectiveness of an agreement may be misleading. Fourth, without 
transfers and under open membership rule no stable coalition exists. This stressed that coop-
eration proves difficult because of large asymmetries between regions. Fifth, the success of 
cooperation improves through transfers, though no more than three out of six world regions 
participate in stable cooperation. Thus, making agreements profitable through transfers is a 
necessary but by no means a sufficient condition to establish successful self-enforcing trea-
ties. Strong free-rider incentives are an obstacle to higher participation and success. Sixth, 
changing the institutional design from open to exclusive membership can make a big differ-
ence and may be as important as transfers. This indicates that in future environmental treaties 
open membership should not be taken for granted despite it may seem an obvious rule in the 
context of public goods. Seventh, moral motives may not always be a good guide to establish 
effective agreements if they are not in line with fundamental free-rider incentives.  
Evidently, models are limited in their applicability. From a positive view point and with 
reference to the Introduction, we mention three aspects. First, technical restrictions forced us 
to restrict the number of agents to only six where in reality we roughly count 200 countries. In 
particular, the level of aggregation of ROW is very high that may lead to an overestimation of 
the prospectives of stable cooperation (see section 3, in particular, footnote 6). Second, our 
integrated assessement model CWSM, as well as most CGE-models analyzing climate 
change, assumes damages to be certain. On the one hand, this may lead to an overestimation 
of the incentives of cooperation. On the other hand, there are voices that claim that damage 
estimates in RICE (that are the basis of CWSM) are too low, see Kaufmann, 1997. Moreover, 
provided some agents would attach some probability to uncertain catastrophic events caused 
by global warming, then our assumptions imply an underestimation. Third, also our long time 
horizon may overestimate the forsight of politicans. However, a much shorter period would 
simply ignore the climate problem and would provide no incentive for cooperation at all. 
Moreover, discounting adjusts “too much” forsight downward. From a normative point, the 
limitations are less severe when focusing more on the qualitative instead on the quantitative 
results, which seems sensible given the uncertainty associated with cost-benefit data.   20
For future research we would like to mention two of certainly many possible options. First, it 
would be interesting to gain more theoretical insights how transfer schemes should be 
designed so that they neutralize free-rider incentives in an “optimal way”. Second, in the 
absence of transfers, it would be interesting to analyze how abatement duties should be allo-
cated to improve upon the success of self-enforcing treaties. This may well imply less ambi-
tious abatement targets and/or departure from an efficient abatement allocation within a coa-
lition if this is compensated by a larger participation. 
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Table A1: List of Variables 
 
i,t Y   production (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t Z   consumption (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t I   investment (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t K   capital stock (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t C   cost of abatement (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t D   damage from climate change (billion 1990 US$) 
i,t E   carbon emissions (billion tons of C) 
i,t µ  emission  abatement 
t M   atmospheric carbon concentration (billion tons of C) 
t F   radiative forcing (Watt per m²) 
x
t F   exogenous radiative forcing (Watt per m²) 
a
t T   temperature increase in the atmosphere (°C) 
0
t T   temperature increase in the deep ocean (°C) 
t T ∆   change of temperature increase in the atmosphere (°C) 










































i Y  (%)  0
i K  (%)  0
i L  (%)  0
i E  (%) 
USA 5,464.796 25.9  14,262.510 26.3 250.372 4.8  1.360 20.5
JPN 2,932.055 13.9  8,442.250 15.6 123.537 2.4  0.292  10.9
EU 6,828.042 32.4  18,435.710 34.0 366.497 7.0  0.872  28.9
CHN 370.024 1.8  1,025.790 1.9 1,133.683 21.5  0.669  3.0
FSU 855.207 4.1  2,281.900 4.2 289.324 5.5  1.066  6.8
ROW 4,628.621 22.0  9,842.220 18.1 3,102.689 58.9  1.700  29.9
World 21,078.750 100.0 54,290.380 100.0 5,266.100 100.0  5.959  100.0
* 
0
i Y  and 
0
i K  million US$, 
0
i L  million people and 
0
i E  giga tons. 
  i,1 θ   i,2 θ   i,1 b   i,2 b   i ρ  
USA 0.01102  2.0 0.07  2.887 0.015
JPN 0.01174 2.0 0.05 2.887 0.015
EU 0.01174  2.0  0.05  2.887 0.015
CHN 0.01523  2.0  0.15  2.887 0.030
FSU 0.00857 2.0 0.15 2.887 0.015
ROW 0.02093  2.0  0.10  2.887 0.030
Table A2: Global Parameter Values 
i,t a 
i,t L 
i,t α  
K δ      
γ       
β      
M δ     
1 τ       
2 τ       
3 τ       
λ 
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0




capital depreciation rate 
capital productivity parameter 
airborne fraction of carbon emissions 
atmospheric carbon removal rate 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
parameter temperature relationship 
initial carbon concentration 
initial temperature atmosphere 















Table A3: Regional Parameter Values 















































































Number of Coalition 
Structures 
(2) 
List of Coalition Structures 
 
(3) 
1 (1,1,1,1,1,1)  1  1 
2 (2,1,1,1,1)  15  2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16 
3 (3,1,1,1)  20  17,18,19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,
31,32,33,34,35,36 
4 (4,1,1)  15  37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47,48,49,50,
51 
5 (5,1)  6  52,53,54,55,56,57 
6 (6)  1  58 
* Underlined means individually rational and bold means internally stable assuming no transfers. 
 
Table 2: Welfare and Ecological Implications of Different Coalition Structures* 
Coalition Structure 




6 grand  coalition  58 100.0 100.0  100.0
5  USA, EU, CHN, FSU, ROW  53 99.1 92.2  93.0
5  USA, JPN, EU, CHN, ROW  56 96.6 90.0  91.1
5  JPN, EU, CHN, FSU, ROW   52 95.6 80.6  81.9
4  USA, EU, CHN, ROW   44 94.5 82.0  83.2
5  USA, JPN, CHN, FSU, ROW   54 93.2 73.2  74.8
4  EU, CHN, FSU, ROW   37 91.3 72.3  73.6
4  JPN, EU, CHN, ROW  41 89.6 69.8  71.5
4  USA, CHN, FSU, ROW  39 87.4 64.1  65.7
4  USA, JPN, CHN, ROW  47 85.9 61.8  63.9
3  EU, CHN, ROW   21 84.0 60.7  62.6
3 USA,  CHN,  ROW  25 78.8 52.0  54.3
4  JPN, CHN, FSU, ROW  38 78.4 50.3  52.6
5  USA, JPN, EU, FSU, ROW  55 70.3 66.0  67.1
4  USA, EU, FSU, ROW  43 69.1 61.0  62.0
… …  … ... ...  ...
2 JPN,  ROW  5 46.4 24.7  26.8
5  USA, JPN, EU, CHN, FSU  57 31.0 26.9  27.5
4  USA, EU, CHN, FSU  45 29.0 24.5  25.0
… …  … ... ...  ...
4  USA, JPN, EU, FSU („old Kyoto“)  50 5.07 1.58  2.14
… …  … ... ...  ...
3  JPN, EU, FSU (“new Kyoto”)  28 2.9 0.7  1.0
… …  … ... ...  ...
2 JPN,  EU  14 0.6 0.2  0.3
1  only singleton coalitions  1 0.0 0.0  0.0
* Size: size of coalition S in coalition structure c=(S, 1, ..., 1); membership: only members in coalition S 
are listed; welfare: discounted global lifetime consumption integrated over 1990-2300; emissions: global 
emissions integrated over 1990-2300; concentration: atmospheric carbon concentration at t=2300. Welfare, 
emission and concentration levels are expressed as the relative difference between these levels in a coali-
tion structure and in the social optimum and the difference between Nash equilibrium and social optimum.   III
 
Table 3: Background Information of Scenarios 
  USA JPN  EU  CHN FSU  ROW  Total 
Ei/POPi  5432 2364 2379 590 3685 548  1132 
GDPi/POPi 21827 23734 18630 326 2956 1492 4003  Indicators  
Ei/GDPi  249 100 128  1808 1246 367  283 
λi - - - - - -  -





VISi 3  3  0  31  18  12  67 
λi   0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17  1 
ti   -341 -20 -629 579  64  347  990 
Scenario 1: 
Egalitarian 1  λi=1/#S 
VISi  25 15 26 0  4  0  70 
λi   0.05 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.05 0.59  1 











VISi  25 26 24 0  22  0  97 
λi   0.04 0.09 0.09 0.35 0.06 0.38  1 










E/ P O P







VISi 26  22  24  0 22 0  94 
λi   0.11 0.10 0.11 0.30 0.17 0.21  1 
ti   -450 -132 -730 818  76  418  1312 
Scenario 4a: 
Ability to 
Pay (η=0.25)  VISi  25 23 26 0  7  0  81 
λi   0.01 0.01 0.01 0.73 0.08 0.16  1 
ti   -617 -297  -902 1572 -89 334 1906 
Scenario 4b: 
Ability to 
Pay (η=1)  VISi  25 26 25 0  15  0  91 
λi   0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00  1 

















VISi  26 26 25 0  22 15 114 
λi   0.16 0.39 0.30 0.02 0.03 0.11  1 


















VISi  22 0 15  10  26 1  74 
λi   0.06 0.03 0.03 0.46 0.32 0.09  1 












VISi  25 26 26 0  1  8  86 
λi   0.36 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.25 0.04  1 












VISi  2 15  25 0  0 12 54 
λi   0.32 0.34 0.27 0.01 0.04 0.02  1 







E/ P O P




VISi  7 0  22  23  25  16 93 
Legend: Indicators are calculated using base data in Table A4 (Appendix) with  ii GDP Y = 0  (gross domestic 
product), POPi=Li (population) and  ii EE = 0  (emissions). Emissions per capita (Ei/POPi) are measured in kilo-
gram carbon per capita, GDP per capita (GDPi/POPi) in US$ per capita and emission intensity of GDP (Ei/GDPi) 
in gram carbon per US$. λi: weight of transfer scheme (see section 4.2.1), ti : transfer (billion US$), VISi: num-
ber of violations of internal stability. „Total“ for transfers in the last column refers to the sum of all positive 
transfers.  
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Table 4: Stable Coalition Structures under Open and Exclusive Membership 






































































































































Size  Membership  No.  0  1  2  3  4a  4b  4c  5  6  7  8 
3  EU,CHN,ROW  21  84.0               X   
3  CHN,FSU,ROW  17 68.3    X,X              
3  JPN,CHN,ROW  23  67.6               X   
3  USA,FSU,ROW  20 60.7  X               
3  USA,JPN,ROW  33 59.0  X              X,X 
2  EU,ROW  4 57.5  X     X    X X X X    X 
2  CHN,ROW   3 54.6      X,X  X,X  X,X X,X  X,X      X  
3  JPN,FSU,ROW  19 54.2  X              
2  USA,ROW   6 54.1  X     X X X  X  X  X 
2  FSU,ROW   2 47.2  X     X X X  X  X  X 
2  JPN,ROW   5 46.4  X     X X    X  X,X  X    
3  USA,CHN,FSU  26  20.5                 X,X   
2  EU,CHN  11  18.6            X,X         
2  USA,CHN  13  15.5            X,X        X 
2  JPN,CHN  12  9.7            X,X       X,X 
2  CHN,FSU  7  8.7            X,X   X,X    
2  EU,FSU  8  2.1            X      
2  USA,FSU  10  1.8            X      
2  USA,EU  15  1.6            X      
2  JPN,FSU  9  1.1            X      
2  JPN,EU  14  0.6            X      
number of stable cs, open membership  0  1  1  1  1  1  5  1  1  1  2 
max. welfare of stable cs, open membership  -  68.3  54.6  54.6  54.6  54.6  54.6  46.4  8.7  20.5  59.0 
number of stable cs, excl. membership  7  1  1  5  4  4  14  2  5  3  7 
max. welfare of stable cs, excl. membership  60.7  68.3  54.6  57.5  54.6  57.5  57.5  57.5  57.5  84.0  59.0 
Legend: List of coalition structures that are internally and externally stable in some scenarios. Coalition structures are sorted in descending order of global welfare; welfare 
measured as “closing the gap index”; see table 2. X means internally and externally stable under open membership, X means internally and externally stable under exclusive 
membership, assuming unanimity voting.    
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